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Promoting Progress or Rewarding Authors?
Copyright Law and Free Speech in
Bonneville International Corp. v. Peters
I. INTRODUCTION
As a broadcast medium, radio traditionally has been subject to
government regulation that would be prohibited by the First
Amendment if applied to other speakers.1 Although the factors that
justify speech-infringing regulation of radio broadcasters “are not
present in cyberspace,”2 delivery of radio content on the Internet was
met almost immediately with government regulation that threatened
its existence.3 In mid-2001, Judge Berle Schiller of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania ordered Salt Lake City’s KSL 1160 AM and
other stations around the country to pay millions of dollars in
royalties to record companies for the privilege of continuing to make
radio broadcasts available over the Internet.4 Bonneville International
Corp. v. Peters5 represents the viewpoint of a single federal district
court judge, but the decision has been widely noted by scholars as
groundbreaking.6 Bonneville is important because it addresses the

1. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (finding that “special justifications
for regulation of the broadcast media” include the long history of government regulation of
broadcasters, the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, and the invasive nature of broadcasting).
2. Id.
3. See Vince Horiuchi, Ruling Makes Simulcasting Music on Internet Pricier for
Stations, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 3, 2001, at A1 (noting that government regulation requiring
payment of licensing fees for digital broadcasts of sound recordings forced radio stations across
the country to discontinue online broadcasts); Ronna Abramson, Court Deals Webcasters a
Royal(ty) Blow, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Aug. 2, 2001 (reporting that “[m]any radio
broadcasters removed their Webcasts after” the U.S. Copyright Office ruled that broadcasters
of digital sound recordings had to pay royalties to record companies), at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,28450,00.html.
4. Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., David Balaban, The Battle of the Music Industry: The Distribution of Audio
and Video Works Via the Internet, Music and More, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 235, 253 n.101 (2001) (taking note of Judge Schiller’s decision and its approval of a
U.S. Copyright Office rulemaking that had been rendered “with perhaps questionable
authority”); Raffi Zerounian, Bonneville International v. Peters, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 47,
47 (2002) (“[T]he district court allowed the Copyright Office to make a decision
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extent of the right to public digital performance of a sound
recording in the area of broadcast radio on the Internet.7
The district court’s reasoning in Bonneville suffers two primary
flaws that undercut the constitutional purpose of copyright law and
raise questions about abridgement of speech. First, the trial court
failed to give effect to congressional intent regarding the right to
digitally perform sound recordings. Second, the court made an
unsupported empirical assumption about potential economic harm of
online radio broadcasts. The Bonneville case illustrates the potential
for courts blinded by technology and globalization to transform
copyright law from a society-based system aiming to promote
scientific and artistic progress into an individual-based, moral-rights
system aiming to compensate authors. Bonneville also illustrates that
courts interpreting copyright law without considering the policies
behind the Speech Clause of the First Amendment may unnecessarily
restrict speech by limiting public access to information.
This Note begins by discussing the purpose of U.S. copyright
law and the effects of globalization and technology on the Copyright
Act during the twentieth century. Part III describes the factual and
procedural aspects of Bonneville as well as the reasoning of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in that case. Part IV discusses the
interplay between copyright and free speech by first evaluating the
Bonneville court’s interpretation of the Copyright Act and then
examining what First Amendment policies add to the adjudication of
copyright law questions. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
When Congress adopted the first Copyright Act in 1790, the
rights of authors clearly gave way to the desire of the Framers to
prevent “the evil of state-sanctioned monopoly.”8 In the first decade
of U.S. copyright law, only five percent of the books published
received copyright protection; copyrighted works joined the more
numerous uncopyrighted works in the public domain after just
unprecedented in its history.”). See generally Joshua P. Binder, Current Developments of Public
Performance Rights for Sound Recordings Transmitted Online: You Push Play, but Who Gets
Paid?, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the ramifications of Bonneville for
compensation of sound recording copyright owners).
7. See Zerounian, supra note 6, at 47.
8. Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1062
(2001).
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fourteen years.9 Today’s Copyright Act hardly resembles the 1790
statute: registration is no longer required so virtually every creative
work imaginable is automatically copyrighted as long as it meets the
low thresholds of originality10 and fixation.11 For works created after
January 1, 1978, copyright endures for the life of the author plus
seventy years.12
Copyright law encompasses not facts or ideas, but an author’s
expression in literary, musical, dramatic, filmed, recorded, and other
formats.13 Among six exclusive rights14 spelled out in the Copyright
Act, this Note discusses the right of public digital performance of a
sound recording. Congress created this narrow public performance
right in the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995 (“DPRA”)15 and modified it in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”).16
A. Constitutional Purpose of Copyright Law
The constitutional Copyright Clause gives Congress power “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”17 Critical to an understanding
of copyrights is the fact that the Framers not only granted Congress
the power to allow copyrights but also specified a purpose—to
promote scientific and artistic progress—and the means to

9. Id. at 1061.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Originality does not necessarily require artistic value
or even novelty, “only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
11. A work is “fixed,” under the statutory definition, “when its embodiment in a copy
or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
12. Id. § 302(a) (2000).
13. See id. § 102(a).
14. The rights are reproduction, preparation of derivative works, public distribution,
public performance, public display, and public digital performance of a sound recording. See id.
§ 106.
15. Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336.
16. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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accomplish that purpose, “by granting, not to publishers, but to
authors, ‘exclusive Right[s]’ ‘for limited Times.’”18
In their struggle to “make[] reward to the owner a secondary
consideration”19 while still guaranteeing “valuable, enforceable
rights”20 sufficient to encourage scientific and artistic progress, U.S.
courts have given substantial consideration to economic factors21
while repeating standard explanations for not subjecting copyright
law to scrutiny under the Speech Clause of the First Amendment.22
Concerns about copyright law’s effect on speech freedoms
traditionally have been met with the argument that copyright law
internally accounts for the First Amendment through the ideaexpression dichotomy,23 the doctrine of fair use,24 and the limited
term of copyrights.25 However, even if copyright law is not directly
subject to First Amendment scrutiny, scholars and jurists have
suggested that the policies behind the Speech Clause should guide
courts’ decision making on certain copyright law questions.26
18. Lessig, supra note 8, at 1062.
19. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (quoting United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
20. Id. (quoting Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
21. See id. (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
22. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001).
23. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556 (holding that copyright laws do not violate the
First Amendment because copyright protects only an author’s expression and not the author’s
ideas).
24. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014, 1028 (“First Amendment concerns in copyright are
allayed by the presence of the fair use doctrine,” which permits certain uses of copyrighted
works based on an analysis of statutory factors including “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for the work.”).
25. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7–12 (2001).
26. See, e.g., Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (holding that “courts cannot permit [the Copyright Act] to sweep
in an unnecessarily broad manner” so as to inhibit the free flow of information and effect a
prior restraint on commercial speech), aff’d on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980);
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1884, 1917 (2000) (copyright law’s tendency to concentrate the power
“to determine the mix of speech that comprises our public discourse” militates against
strengthening the rights of copyright holders); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom
of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2466
(1998) (copyright law cases must be subject to the First Amendment’s procedural and due
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Two phenomena that have led to changes in copyright law that
cause First Amendment concerns are globalization and technology.
First, the Internet’s global nature raises the specter of international
piracy, especially with respect to music copyrighted in the United
States.27 In response to that threat, U.S. copyright holders have
encouraged the federal government to join international treaties such
as the Berne Convention that, under the principle of national
treatment, afford U.S. copyright holders the same protection in
foreign countries enjoyed by copyright holders native to those
countries.28 The Berne Convention, however, also incorporates the
theory of moral rights:
which requires recognition of the right of an author to be named as
the author of a work (the right of paternity) and the right for an
author to object to uses of a work which would bring dishonor or
discredit on his or her reputation (the right of integrity).29

The infusion of moral rights into U.S. copyright law raises
constitutional questions because Congress’s right to grant copyrights
may only be exercised to promote the progress of science and art,
not to protect paternity and integrity rights of authors.30

process safeguards as well as “independent judgment review” on appeal of determinations
about copyrightable expression versus non-copyrightable ideas).
27. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTER SCI. AND TELECOMS. BD., THE
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42 (2000) (“Sites
containing illegal copies of music, for example, are quite popular and are found around the
world, raising issues of jurisdiction and presenting great difficulties in enforcement.”),
available at http://books.nap.edu/html/digital%5Fdilemma [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL].
28. See INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 140 (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
29. Id. at 145.
30. Id. at 146. In the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Napster, it became
apparent that the theory of “moral rights,” or property as personhood, had intellectual
attraction: “By providing the infrastructure through which copyrighted works are shared,
Napster interferes with the ability of artists to experience personhood. . . . The immoral aspect
of Napster is that it strips artists of control over their copyrighted work, which is personal
property.” Zachary M. Garsek, Napster Through the Scope of Property and Personhood: Leaving
Artists Incomplete People, 19 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 19 (2001). But cf. David Nimmer, Essay,
The End of Copyright, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1385, 1414 n.177 (1995) (noting that “[t]he United
States has made clear to hostile negotiating partners that U.S. copyright owners will abandon
any proffered benefit in order to prevent any increased moral rights obligations . . . from
becoming enforceable or even subject to toothless legal scrutiny” (internal citations omitted)).
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Second, technological advances have caused copyright owners to
fear that copyrights will be more easily infringed.31 Digital
information is more frequently copied than nondigital information;
computers, for example, routinely make copies of copyrighted works
to facilitate access32 even for nonfringing uses. This characteristic of
technology raises First Amendment concerns because free speech
depends on free flow of information33 and, “in the digital world,
where no access is possible except by copying, complete control of
copying would mean control of access as well.”34 Restricted access to
copyrighted digital works inhibits the “democratization of
information and knowledge”35 and results in a less informed public.36
B. Creation of Right to Digitally Perform Sound Recordings
The Copyright Act recognizes two copyrights in a song played
on the radio: the copyright in the musical composition, which is
usually held by the songwriter, and the copyright in the sound
recording, which is usually held by the record company that
employed the songwriter.37 While the underlying musical
composition includes a public performance right that compensates
artists each time one of their songs is played on the radio, sound
recordings do not include a broad public performance right,
meaning that record labels do not receive compensation for each
radio broadcast of a song.38 Beginning in the 1920s, record
companies began lobbying Congress to create a public performance
right for sound recordings.39 For decades, Congress rejected the
lobbyists’ advances, reasoning that the sought-after remedies already
existed under copyright infringement theories for the various rights
then afforded copyright owners.40
31. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 27, at 31 (“Rights holders may seek to
control access to digital information, because access involves reproduction.”).
32. See id.
33. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1993) (stating that in the context of
commercial speech, the state law “threatens societal interests in broad access to complete and
accurate commercial information that [the] First Amendment . . . is designed to safeguard”).
34. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 27, at 31.
35. Id. at 201.
36. See id.
37. See Binder, supra note 6, at 3–4; Balaban, supra note 6, at 252.
38. Balaban, supra note 6, at 252.
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 10 (1995).
40. See id. at 11.
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1. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
Congress, in 1995, created a limited right “in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission.”41 In creating the right, however,
Congress took great pains to exclude over-the-air broadcasts such as
those effected by commercial radio stations. Congress was primarily
concerned with preventing digital subscription42 and interactive43
services from benefiting without compensation to the copyright
holders.44 In fact, Congress clearly intended not to subject
commercial broadcast radio stations to the new limited right to
digitally perform a sound recording.45 Thus, Congress exempted
from the digital audio performance right a variety of transmissions,
notably nonsubscription broadcast transmissions such as those
effected by commercial radio stations licensed by the Federal
Communications Commission.
2. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
In 1998, Congress outlawed circumvention of technologies such
as encryption and watermarking that prevent access to copyrighted

41. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
§ 2, 109 Stat. 336.
42. “A subscription transmission is one that is controlled and limited to particular
recipients, and for which the recipients must pay consideration.” Balaban, supra note 6, at 256.
43. “Services such as audio-on-demand, pay-per-listen, and celestial jukebox
transmissions are all examples of interactive services.” Id. at 255.
44. A House report stated:
This legislation is a narrowly crafted response to one of the concerns expressed
by representatives of the recording community, namely that certain types of
subscription and interaction audio services might adversely affect sales of sound
recordings and erode copyright owners’ ability to control and be paid for use of
their work. Subscription and interactive audio services can provide multi-channel
offerings of various music formats in CD-quality recordings, commercial free and 24
hours a day.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13.
45. The House report accompanying the bill stated:
The sale of many sound recordings and the careers of many performers have
benefitted considerably from airplay and other promotional activities provided by
both noncommercial and advertiser-supported, free over-the-air broadcasting. The
radio industry has grown and prospered with the availability and use of prerecorded
music. H.R. 1506 does not change or jeopardize the mutually beneficial economic
relationship between the recording and traditional broadcasting industries.
Id.
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digital works.46 The DMCA also slightly altered the DPRA’s
statutory licensing scheme for transmissions that did not qualify for
an exemption from the digital audio transmission right.47 The
DMCA subjected “eligible nonsubscription transmissions” to the
statutory licensing scheme, while continuing to exempt other
nonsubscription
broadcast
transmissions.
An
“eligible
nonsubscription transmission” was defined as:
a noninteractive nonsubscription digital audio transmission . . . that
is made as part of a service that provides audio programming
consisting, in whole or in part, of performances of sound
recordings, including retransmissions of broadcast transmissions, if
the primary purpose of the service is to provide to the public such
audio or other entertainment programming, and the primary
purpose of the service is not to sell, advertise, or promote particular
products or services other than sound recordings, live concerts, or
other music-related events.48

The amendment made by the DMCA appeared to have no effect
on radio stations that broadcast over the Internet.49 The Internet
programming of broadcast radio stations seemingly does not fit
within the definition of an “eligible nonsubscription transmission”
because the stations seek to sell consumer products and services
“other than sound recordings, live concerts, or other music-related
events,”50 through commercial advertisements. In maintaining the
exemption for radio stations based on their non-music-related
commercial messages, Congress evidently recognized that “society
also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial
information.”51 The Supreme Court has asserted that ensuring free
flow of commercial information serves the First Amendment goal of

46. Balaban, supra note 6, at 258–59.
47. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 405, 112 Stat.
2860.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6) (2000).
49. The U.S. Copyright Office concluded otherwise in its published summary of the
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, where the Copyright Office stated that
the Act meant to subject Internet streaming activities to the statutory license. See U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998, at 16 (1998).
This discrepancy lies at the heart of the issues discussed in the remainder of this Note.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6).
51. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764
(1976).
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assisting the public to make informed decisions about economic
matters in the free enterprise system.52
C. Delivering Radio Content on the Internet
With the growth of the Internet in the late 1990s, traditional
broadcast radio stations began delivering their content online in an
effort to reach listeners who, for example, might have a personal
computer in front of them at work but no radio.53 AM/FM
webcasting “is the digital audio transmission of a sound recording or
live performance over the Internet where no permanent copy of an
audio file is created on a listener’s computer.”54 Two important
features of webcasting that relate to the infringement concerns of
copyright holders are quality of sound and potential for copying:
“the sound quality of webcasted music is generally lower than that of
a CD,”55 and “[a]lthough webcasting is quite similar to a radio
broadcast, there is no easy way to record it digitally.”56
In contrast with AM/FM webcasting, or streaming,57 certain
Internet sites facilitate downloading, or “digital phonorecord
delivery,” which “occurs when a user receives a complete digital
audio file onto a hard drive or other media storage device.”58 Like
webcasting, downloading music in a compressed format like an MP3
may result in imperfect sound quality; unlike webcasting or
streaming, however, download delivery creates actual copies of songs
on a listener’s computer.59
III. BONNEVILLE INTERNATIONAL CORP. V. PETERS
A. Facts and Procedural History
On March 1, 2000, the Recording Industry Association of
America (“RIAA”) petitioned the U.S. Copyright Office for a
rulemaking to determine whether AM/FM broadcasters who
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 764–65.
Horiuchi, supra note 3.
Binder, supra note 6, at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
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engaged in streaming were subject to the statutory licensing scheme
established by the 1995 and 1998 amendments to the Copyright
Act, or whether AM/FM audio streaming fell under the
“nonsubscription broadcast transmission” exemption60 to the digital
audio performance of a sound recording right. In response to the
Copyright Office’s March 16, 2000, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”) filed
suit against RIAA seeking a declaratory judgment that AM/FM
streaming was exempt from the public performance of a sound
recording right in 17 U.S.C. § 106.61 The Copyright Office refused
to suspend its rulemaking process despite the NAB suit, and the
Copyright Office’s December 11, 2000, rulemaking determined that
AM/FM streaming was subject to the statutory license provisions of
the Copyright Act because streaming was not exempt from the
public performance of a sound recording right.62 Eventually, the
NAB suit was dismissed.63
In response to the rulemaking, Salt Lake City-based Bonneville
International Corporation, which owns twenty radio stations from
Chicago to San Francisco, and six other national radio station
owners—along with the NAB—filed suit in March 2001 against the
Copyright Office.64 The broadcasters’ suit sought to overturn the
rulemaking so that AM/FM streamers would not have to pay
statutory licensing fees to record companies.
B. The Holding of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
In its Bonneville decision, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
determined that “Congress implicitly, if not explicitly, entrusted the
Copyright Office with the task of determining which entities and
means of transmission would be exempted by [17 U.S.C. §] 114
from the public performance rights of [17 U.S.C. §] 106.”65 The
court then stated that, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,66 it was required first to determine
60. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(1)(A).
61. See Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 770 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
62. Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of a Service, 65 Fed. Reg.
77,292, 77,293 (Dec. 11, 2000) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).
63. See Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 770 n.9.
64. Horiuchi, supra note 3.
65. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 773.
66. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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whether Congress had directly addressed the issue before the court.
If so, the court was required to honor that intent. If not, the court
was “to proceed to the second part of the inquiry and determine
‘whether the agency’s answer is a reasonable one based on a
permissible construction of the statute.’”67
1. First part of Chevron inquiry
Engaging in the first part of the Chevron inquiry, the court held
that Congress had not directly addressed the question of whether
FCC-licensed broadcasters streaming their content over the Internet
were exempt from the digital audio performance of a sound
recording right.68 The court based its decision in this part of the
inquiry on three factors: Congress’s decision not to exempt
webcasting, the fact that AM/FM broadcasters who stream are not
licensed to do so by the FCC, and conflicts with other sections of
the statute.69
a. Congress’s decision not to exempt webcasting. The court
remarked that “[i]t is strange that Congress would choose not to
exempt webcasting, but choose to exempt AM/FM streaming, an
activity that shares many characteristics with webcasting.”70 Thus, the
court concluded, Congress must have intended to exempt neither
streaming nor webcasting from the limited public performance of a
sound recording right.
Neither streaming nor webcasting are mentioned anywhere in
the relevant portions of the Copyright Act.71 The court apparently
based its statement that webcasting was not exempted on a
congressional committee’s report on the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. The committee stated that the DMCA would amend
the Copyright Act “to delete two exemptions that were either the
cause of confusion as to the application of the DPRA to certain
nonsubscription services (especially webcasters) or which overlapped

67. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 773 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
68. Id. at 779 (holding that “[t]he statute is either silent, or, at best, ambiguous on the
issue”).
69. Id. at 774–79.
70. Id. at 775.
71. The distinction between streaming and webcasting is not at all clear. The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania Court’s use of the terms interchangeably seems to preclude any
suggestion by the court that webcasting and streaming are materially different. See id. at 779.
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with other exemptions.”72 However, the same report also clarified
that “deletion of these two exemptions is not intended to affect the
exemption for nonsubscription broadcast transmissions.”73
The court pointed out that, in connection with the DMCA,
“[t]he House Manager noted that ‘services commonly known as
“webcasters” have begun offering the public multiple highly-themed
genre channels of sound recordings on a nonsubscription basis.’”74
In this context, the term “webcasting” is used not to apply to
AM/FM webcasting but rather to what has been called “Internet
webcasting,”75 a “Celestial Jukebox” that “require[s] a subscription
or payment, [is] on-demand, or [is] interactive.”76
b. AM/FM broadcasters who stream are not licensed to do so by the
FCC. The court accepted the argument advanced by the RIAA and
the Copyright Office that nonsubscription broadcast transmissions,
which are exempt from infringement of the copyright holder’s public
performance of a digital sound recording right, must be made within
the scope of a radio broadcaster’s FCC license. The Copyright Act
defines a broadcast transmission as a “transmission made by a
terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal
Communications Commission.”77 The court interpreted the phrase
“licensed as such” to require that AM/FM streamers be licensed to
stream their content—an impossible prospect, since the FCC does
not license such activity on the Internet—or be subject to the
statutory license.78
c. Conflicts with other sections of the statute. The court also
accepted arguments by the RIAA and Copyright Office that
exempting AM/FM broadcasters from the limited public
performance right would create conflicts with other sections of the
Copyright Act, thus violating the canon of construction requiring
that a statute should be read as a “harmonious whole.”79 For

72. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-796, at 80 (1998).
73. Id.
74. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 769 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
105TH CONG., SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998, at 50 (Comm. Print 1998)).
75. Zerounian, supra note 6, at 54.
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).
78. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
79. Id.
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example, the court said that exempting AM/FM streamers would
conflict with the portion of the statute that limits exempted
retransmissions to those made within 150 miles of the transmitter, to
local communities, or through a noncommercial, educational
system.80
The court pointed to a portion of the statute that allows
AM/FM broadcasters licensed by the FCC to make one ephemeral81
copy of copyrighted works to facilitate transmissions within their
“local service area.”82 However, AM/FM streamers also must make
an ephemeral copy in order to facilitate transmission over the
Internet. Because the statute mentions “local service area” in
connection with ephemeral copies, the court concluded that either
Congress did not intend for AM/FM streaming, which can be global
in nature, to be exempted from the digital audio performance of a
sound recording right or that Congress failed to consider AM/FM
streaming at all when it amended the Copyright Act in both 1995
and 1998.83
2. Second part of Chevron inquiry
Having concluded that Congress failed to directly address the
question at issue in this case—namely, whether AM/FM
broadcasters who stream over the Internet are exempt from the
limited sound recording right—the court then analyzed whether or
not the Copyright Office reached a reasonable conclusion in its
rulemaking. The court held that the Copyright Office’s reasoning—
based on its reading of the statute and its consideration of policy—
was reasonable.84
The court was swayed by the Copyright Office’s conclusion that
the eligibility for the exemption from the public performance of a
digital audio recording right should not turn exclusively on the
identity of the transmitting entity.85 The court also upheld the
80. Id.
81. Under 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(1), an ephemeral copy is a copy used only to facilitate
legal transmission and must be destroyed within six months.
82. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 782–83.
85. Id. at 783 (Copyright Office concluded that it would be unfair to exempt AM/FM
streamers simply because they held FCC licenses while other webcasters without FCC licenses
were not exempt).
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Copyright Office’s finding that AM/FM streamers should not be
exempt because such a conclusion would result in economic harm to
recording companies.86
IV. COPYRIGHT LAW AND FIRST AMENDMENT POLICY
This section analyzes the relationship between copyright and free
speech in two ways. The first issue is whether the Bonneville court
properly interpreted the statutorily expressed intention of Congress
in recent amendments to the Copyright Act. Failing to recognize
that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue,”87 the district court allowed the Copyright Office to expand
the right to digitally perform a sound recording beyond the scope
necessary to serve as incentive for creation of artistic works. Second,
the Note examines the potential for copyright that overzealously
protects the individual rights of authors to undermine the
constitutional goal of promoting artistic progress and to upset the
delicate balance between copyright and free speech. A moral rights
copyright law regime88 may inhibit access to information89 involving
entertainment90 and commerce91 that are valuable under the policies
behind the First Amendment.
A. The Court Failed to Give Effect to the Intention of Congress
The Bonneville court erred in the first part of its Chevron inquiry
by determining that Congress had not directly addressed the issue of
whether FCC-licensed broadcasters who streamed on the Internet
were exempt from the digital performance of a sound recording
right. In fact, Congress clearly had addressed the issue and had
86. Id. at 784 (The Copyright Office concluded that nonsubscription, noninteractive
digital broadcasts made by an AM/FM streamer over the Internet and accessible outside the
streamer’s FCC-defined geographic area “are subject to the statutory license in order to
compensate recording companies for the risk of lost sales due to the possibility that a listener
may make a high quality unauthorized copy directly from the transmission.”).
87. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
88. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 27, at 56–57.
89. See id. at 201–02 (asserting that recent developments in copyright law threaten to
cut off access to many copyrighted works in the digital realm).
90. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (holding that neither the entertainment
aspect nor the profit-making purpose of motion pictures disqualified films from First
Amendment protection).
91. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
764 (1976).
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exempted radio broadcasters. Below, this Note argues that,
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction, [the court
should have] ascertain[ed] that Congress had an intention on the
precise question at issue,”92 and thus should have given effect to that
intention.
1. The court did not read the plain language of the statute
a. “Nonsubscription broadcast transmission” encompasses AM/FM
streaming. It is uncontroverted that Congress, in creating the digital
audio performance of a sound recording right in 1995 and tinkering
with it in 1998, intended to exempt nonsubscription broadcast
transmissions.93 The primary question, then, is whether AM/FM
streaming constitutes a nonsubscription transmission. A
nonsubscription transmission is defined in the Copyright Act as one
that is “not a subscription transmission.”94 A subscription
transmission is defined as “a transmission that is controlled and
limited to particular recipients, and for which consideration is
required to be paid or otherwise given by or on behalf of the
recipient to receive the transmission or a package of transmissions
including the transmission.”95
Reading the plain language of the statute, the court should have
concluded that Congress did not intend to say that radio stations
make subscription transmissions. The broadcast of an AM or FM
station, including one streamed on the Internet, is not limited and
controlled to particular recipients but is open to any and all listeners
who make the effort to tune in or log on. Also, the recipients or
listeners do not directly pay or give consideration to the radio
broadcaster. Rather, the broadcaster is compensated through
advertisers seeking to reach the listeners with their commercial
messages.96 Thus, AM/FM streaming is a nonsubscription broadcast
transmission.
92. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
93. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 13 (1995); Balaban, supra note 6, at 257 (stating
that “Congress . . . felt that transmissions that are on a non-subscription basis, like traditional
style radio broadcasts over the internet, posed only a low risk of replacing record sales” but
then noting that “the Copyright Office has since taken a somewhat contrary position”).
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(9) (2000).
95. Id. § 114(j)(14).
96. See Binder, supra note 6, at 2 (“Radio stations broadcast popular music to draw a
listener’s attention to the airtime they sell to advertisers.”).
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The argument that Congress, upon adopting the DMCA in
1998, did not intend to subject AM/FM streaming to the statutory
license is bolstered by examining what Congress did subject to the
statutory license in 1998. At that time, Congress added “eligible
nonsubscription transmission[s]”97 to the list of transmissions not
exempted from statutory licensing fees with regard to public
performance of digital audio recordings. However, radio streaming is
not an eligible nonsubscription transmission because AM/FM
broadcasters who stream content over the Internet are not primarily
interested in promoting “sound recordings, live concerts, or other
music-related events” but instead intend to play music solely to
attract listeners so they can “sell, advertise, or promote particular
products or services”98 through commercial advertisements.
Because AM/FM streamers clearly fall under the definition given
in the Copyright Act for those who conduct nonsubscription
broadcast transmissions, the court incorrectly held that Congress had
not addressed the issue of whether AM/FM streaming should be
exempt from the exclusive rights of copyright holders.
b. Neither the statute nor the court articulated a material
difference between webcasting and streaming. The court put stock in
the fact that it was not reasonable to assume that Congress would
exempt streaming while not exempting webcasting.99 The court
seemed to rely on a congressional report100 that at best indicates that
Congress in 1998 had considered the effects of Internet webcasting,
or the celestial jukebox, which is not the same as AM/FM
webcasting.101 The idea that Congress did not mean to exempt
AM/FM webcasting is controverted in the same congressional
report, which states that the DMCA did nothing to change the
exemption for nonsubscription broadcast transmissions.102
The distinction between Internet webcasting and AM/FM
webcasting, or streaming, militates in favor of the idea that Congress
meant to exempt AM/FM webcasting but not Internet webcasting.
The House Manager said that Internet webcasting involves “highly97.
note 48.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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For the Copyright Act’s definition of such transactions, see supra text accompanying
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6).
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 775 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-796, at 80 (1998).
See Zerounian, supra note 6, at 54; Binder, supra note 6, at 16–17.
See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-796, at 80.
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themed genre channels,”103 where there was perceived to be a risk of
high-quality copies being made without compensation to the
copyright holders. That assumption cannot be made with respect to
AM/FM streaming,104 where the content is not subject to the
listener’s preference, and thus AM/FM streaming is unlikely to
facilitate copyright infringement.
This reading of the statute is bolstered by an examination of
other portions of the Copyright Act. The amendments to the Act
made in 1995 and 1998 concerned themselves with the ability of
listeners with access to subscription or interactive services to make
their own high-quality recordings of digital transmissions for free.
For example, the Act states that transmissions are not exempt from
the digital audio performance right where the transmission service
publishes a programming schedule in advance,105 presumably because
notice facilitates copying. However, commercial radio stations,
including those that stream on the Internet, do not give advance
notice of their programming in that way, and so concern about
copying of poor sound quality106 online radio broadcasts is
unnecessary and was not evidently on the mind of Congress.
c. The fact that AM/FM streamers are not “licensed as such” is
irrelevant. The court placed emphasis on the fact that the Copyright
Act defines a broadcast transmission as one made by a terrestrial
broadcast station “licensed as such”107 by the FCC. However, the
court’s reliance108 on this phrase was unjustified. It is a tortured
reading of the statute that suggests the throw-away phrase “licensed
as such” requires AM/FM broadcasters to be subject to more
stringent requirements with respect to Internet streaming than are

103. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 769 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
105TH CONG., SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2281 AS PASSED BY THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON AUGUST 4, 1998, at 50 (Comm. Print 1998)).
104. See Zerounian, supra note 6, at 53 (noting that AM/FM streaming, or simultaneous
Internet broadcasting, does not have “a playlist, skip forward function, method to influence
playlists, or search engine”).
105. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(c)(ii) (2000).
106. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3).
108. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (“It is true that AM/FM broadcasters engaged
in streaming their broadcasts over the Internet are licensed by the FCC. However, the presence
of the term ‘licensed as such by the [FCC]’ suggests not only that a broadcast station is
licensed by the FCC, it implies that the broadcast station is engaging in those activities which
are licensed by the FCC.”).
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other streamers. As has been established, Congress, in amending the
Copyright Act in 1995 and 1998, was primarily concerned with the
impact of subscription, interactive services,109 which require
consideration to be paid and which presumably facilitate copying.
Despite the phrase “licensed as such,” Congress was not
concerned with the identity of those engaged in providing
nonsubscription, noninteractive programming such as an online
radio broadcast. The segments of the Copyright Act pertaining to
the nonsubscription broadcast exemption, taken as a whole, focus
not on the identity of the broadcaster—licensing by the FCC makes
no difference in this context—but on the nature of the broadcasts.110
Broadcasts that are not exempt include those made by services that
require consideration, that control and limit the number and identity
of recipients, and that do not have as their primary purpose the sale
of goods and services other than music-related events. AM/FM
streaming does not fit this description because it does not require
consideration, it does not control and limit the number and identity
of recipients, and it does have as its primary purpose the advertising
and sale of goods and services other than music-related events.
d. Congress had reason to treat retransmissions differently than
AM/FM streaming. The court also focused on the fact that
retransmissions that reach listeners more than 150 miles from the site
of the broadcast are not exempt from the limited sound recording
public performance right in a digital audio work.111 Congress could
not have intended to exempt AM/FM streaming’s original
transmissions while not exempting retransmissions of the same
content, the court reasoned.112 The court concluded that because
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(14).
110. See, e.g., id. § 114(j)(6) (defining an eligible nonsubscription broadcast, which is not
exempt, as “a noninteractive nonsubscription digital audio transmission not exempt under
subsection (d)(1) that is made as part of a service that provides audio programming consisting,
in whole or in part, of performances of sound recordings, including retransmissions of
broadcast transmissions, if the primary purpose of the service is to provide to the public such audio
or other entertainment programming, and the primary purpose of the service is not to sell,
advertise, or promote particular products or services other than sound recordings, live concerts, or
other music-related events” (emphasis added)); id. § 114(j)(14) (defining a subscription
transmission, which is also not exempt, as “a transmission that is controlled and limited to
particular recipients, and for which consideration is required to be paid or otherwise given by or
on behalf of the recipient to receive the transmission or a package of transmissions including
the transmission” (emphasis added)).
111. See id. § 114(d)(1)(B).
112. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 776.
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retransmissions are limited to the broadcaster’s local service area,
Congress must have intended for nonsubscription broadcast
transmissions to be so limited.113
However, both the Copyright Office and the court failed to
examine circumstances affecting the likelihood of reproduction, a key
factor that distinguishes nonsubscription broadcast transmissions
from retransmissions. This failure on the part of the Copyright Office
and the court is notable since factors affecting the likelihood of
reproduction were clearly examined in other contexts.114 In singling
out retransmissions, Congress likely was concerned about the ability
of listeners to copy content because, having heard the content once
already, listeners could anticipate programming. With an original
broadcast, however, the order of programming content has not been
previously disclosed. Thus, Congress apparently concluded that
original, nonsubscription broadcast transmissions such as AM/FM
streaming did not facilitate copying and therefore should be exempt
from the public performance right.
e. The court’s focus on ephemeral copies is misplaced. The
Copyright Act allows broadcast radio stations to make one
ephemeral copy of a copyrighted work to facilitate a broadcast in the
stations’ local service areas.115 However, the Act does not provide for
the use of an ephemeral copy to facilitate AM/FM streaming, which
may be global in nature depending on the listeners who opt to log
on. The court reasoned that this discrepancy supports the
proposition that Congress failed to consider AM/FM streaming and
so the statute is ambiguous.116
This minor apparent oversight on the part of Congress does not
necessarily support that conclusion, however.117 The court here
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
115. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
116. Id.
117. Two bills proposed in Congress after Judge Schiller’s decision in Bonneville would
make the court’s discussion of the ephemeral copy issue moot. The proposed Music Online
Competition Act of 2001, introduced in the House of Representatives August 2, 2001, would
amend 17 U.S.C. § 112 to exempt from copyright infringement liability the making of
multiple ephemeral copies by an entity, such as a broadcast radio station streaming on the
Internet, that is entitled to broadcast a digital sound recording to the public on a
nonsubscription basis. See Music Online Competition Act of 2001, H.R. 2724, 107th Cong.
§ 3(b) (2001). Similarly, the proposed Internet Radio Fairness Act would exempt from
copyright infringement liability the making of multiple ephemeral copies by a broadcast radio
station transmitting on a nonsubscription basis on the Internet. See Internet Radio Fairness
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became overly focused on “copies”118 as predictors of infringement.
This focus on “copies” as predictors of infringement is misplaced for
two reasons. First, copyright infringement no longer depends wholly
on reproduction as it once did.119 Second, technologically advanced
devices—especially computers—now regularly make copies of
copyrighted works simply to provide access120 for noninfringing uses.
An overly intense focus on preventing reproduction of copyrighted
works would give copyright owners more rights in the online world
than in the paper world—and more rights than Congress
intended.121 Control of reproduction is not the goal of copyright law
but simply a mechanism to achieve the goal of promoting knowledge
by providing an incentive for authors and scientists to produce
creative or scientific works.

Act, H.R. 5285, 107th Cong. § 5(a) (2002). The latter proposal clarifies that making multiple
ephemeral copies should not subject the radio station streaming on the Internet to the
statutory license ordered by Judge Schiller in Bonneville. See id. § 5.
118. Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 782–83.
119. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 177 (2001) (“The right to make
copies . . . is not fundamental to copyright in any sense other than the historical one. When the
old copyright laws fixed on reproduction as the compensable (or actionable) unit, it was not
because there is something fundamentally invasive of an author’s rights about making a copy of
something. Rather, it was because, at the time, copies were easy to find and easy to count, so
they were a useful benchmark for deciding when a copyright owner’s rights had been
unlawfully invaded.”).
120. See id. at 178 (“Today, making digital reproductions is an unavoidable incident of
reading, viewing, listening to, learning from, sharing, improving, and reusing works embodied
in digital media. The centrality of copying to use of digital technology is precisely why
reproduction is no longer an appropriate way to measure infringement.”); see also NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 27, at 140 (“[S]o many noninfringing copies are routinely
made in using a computer that the act has lost much of its predictive power: Noting that a
copy has been made tells far less about the legitimacy of the behavior than it does in the hardcopy world.”).
121. LITMAN, supra note 119, at 178 (“[C]ontrol over reproduction could potentially
allow copyright owners control over every use of digital technology in connection with their
protected works. This is not what the Congresses in 1790, 1870, 1909, and 1976 meant to
accomplish when they awarded copyright owners exclusive reproduction rights.”). The
proposed Music Online Competition Act of 2001, introduced in the House of Representatives
August 2, 2001, would exempt from copyright infringement liability the making of a digital
copy of a sound recording by a computer or other device as long as the use of that sound
recording was otherwise lawful. See Music Online Competition Act of 2001, H.R. 2724, 107th
Cong. § 6(b) (2001).
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2. The reasonableness of the Copyright Office’s reading of the statute
Under Chevron, a court that has determined that Congress did
not clearly express its intention must then examine “whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”122 This deferential standard123 may be satisfied in Bonneville
if Congress indeed failed to express its intention with respect to
AM/FM webcasting. However, the reasonableness of the Copyright
Office’s construction of the sound recording performance right in
the online context is called into question by the court’s unsupported
empirical assumption124 about the potential for online radio
broadcasts to harm record sales.
In the case of traditional, non-Internet AM/FM broadcasts, it
has long been recognized that playing copyrighted sound recordings
over the air ultimately pays off for both songwriters and record
companies: “‘[T]he sale of many sound recordings and careers of
many performers have benefitted considerably from airplay and other
promotional activities provided by both noncommercial and
advertiser-supported, free over-the-air broadcasting.’”125 Even today
in the traditional broadcast context, radio stations do not pay record
labels for the right to broadcast sound recordings because the
Copyright Act does not grant public performance rights in that
context.126 Despite an argument by the radio broadcasters that online
broadcasts, like over-the-air broadcasts, would benefit copyright
holders through increased sales,127 the Bonneville court did not
122. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
123. Id. at 843 n.11 (“The court need not conclude that the agency construction was the
only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”).
124. “The global nature and the enhanced quality of the transmissions increase the
likelihood that record sales could be affected by the streaming of AM/FM broadcasts.”
Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
125. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 16 (1995)); see also Balaban, supra note 6, at
253 (“[B]ecause recording artists will receive compensation from increased album sales, the
radio stations argue that they should not have to further compensate recording artists by
paying for a performance right to broadcast music.”).
126. Binder, supra note 6, at 5 (“[A] sound recording lacks the right of public
performance under most circumstances.”); Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (AM/FM
“broadcasters traditionally have not been subject to any public performance right for using a
recording in an AM/FM broadcast.”).
127. “The Broadcasters claimed that just as radio broadcasts on a local scale benefit the
recording industry through the promotion of sales, that same broadcasting activity is even
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require the Copyright Office to provide evidence that AM/FM
webcasting would harm sales.
In fact, there is credible evidence that AM/FM streaming
benefits sound recording copyright holders: “The economics of
AM/FM Radio Webcasting work the same way as they do for overthe-air broadcasting, a symbiotic relationship between the record
companies and the radio stations who ‘promote these songs to 75
percent of Americans who listen to the radio each day.’”128 Evidence
of online broadcasting’s beneficial impact for copyright holders is
not contradicted by the fact that the broadcasts are digital because
streaming, unlike downloading into a format such as MP3, does not
involve creation and storage of a permanent digital audio file on a
radio listener’s computer.129 Because “AM/FM Radio Webcasts are
not likely to be copied”130 and because such webcasts “are not
‘interactive’ or available ‘on demand,’”131 the only economic impact
of streaming for copyright holders is likely to be a positive one.
B. Policy Militates in Favor of Free Speech in
Close Copyright Law Questions
Fundamental changes in the Copyright Act in the last quartercentury have led to calls for application of First Amendment
principles to copyright.132 Globalization caused U.S. adoption of

more beneficial to the recording industry on a global scale due to the greater public exposure.”
Bonneville, 153 F. Supp. at 783 (citation omitted).
128. Zerounian, supra note 6, at 69 (quoting Copyrighted Webcast Programming on the
Internet: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 140 (2000) (statement of Edward O. Fritts, President, National
Association of Broadcasters)).
129. Binder, supra note 6, at 16–17, 29 (“[S]treaming technology makes the data . . .
difficult to copy . . . .”).
130. Zerounian, supra note 6, at 68.
131. Id. at 66.
132. See Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875,
882, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (“[W]hen they operate at cross-purposes, the primacy of the First
Amendment mandates that the Copyright Act be deprived of effectuation.”), aff’d on other
grounds, 626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); Netanel, supra note 25, at 85–86 (“[D]evelopments
in copyright and First Amendment doctrine have rendered the judicial immunization a peculiar
and pernicious anomaly. . . . It is high time for courts to apply appropriate First Amendment
scrutiny . . . .”); C. Edwin Baker, Essay, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 891, 951 (2002) (arguing that because of the speech and press clauses in the First
Amendment, “copyright generally [should not] be applied to limit noncommercial copying”).
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international treaties133 that focus on the “moral rights” of authors
rather than the shared goal of the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment—“ensur[ing] that our society will continue to receive
vital contributions from individuals who otherwise might be
discouraged from doing so.”134 Technology has led to the adoption
of laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which prohibits
circumvention of technological measures designed to block access to
copyrighted works even for noninfringing uses135 of those works.
Congress’s willingness to continually respond to copyright holders’
calls for increased statutory rights136 results in compensation of
authors that is unrelated to the constitutional purpose of copyright—
to promote the progress of science and art. 137
Given those changes in the Copyright Act, the potential exists
for copyright law, as it moves from promoting progress to rewarding
authors, not only to undercut its own ability to promote progress
but also to unnecessarily restrict free speech. Copyright holders who
are allowed to severely restrict access to their works due to concerns
about copying prevent future authors from building on what has
already been done and creating their own new works.138 Such a result
contradicts the constitutional purpose of copyright law. That result
also contradicts the First Amendment policy favoring the protection
of access to information in order to guarantee free speech. Artistic
and commercial expression,139 like political speech,140 facilitate self133. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
134. Triangle Publ’ns, 445 F. Supp. at 882. But cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 23 (2002) (“The policy objective
of copyright—the establishment of ex ante incentives maximally stimulating production of
profitable work—is not the First Amendment’s objective.”).
135. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
136. See Lessig, supra note 8, at 1065 (criticizing Congress’s move, in the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, to lengthen the copyright’s term to the life of the
author plus seventy years).
137. See David G. Savage, Lining Up the Next Term, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2002, at 34
(discussing that in context of U.S. Supreme Court cases over constitutionality of extending
copyright terms for Mickey Mouse and other Hollywood creations, scholars assert that
compensation of authors is not necessary to provide an incentive for societal progress when the
works have already been created, especially when the authors are dead).
138. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 27, at 201–02 (asserting that public
access to copyrighted works “encourag[es] the creation of new knowledge and new works”).
139. See Rubenfeld, supra note 134, at 39 (arguing that the core protection of the First
Amendment—“that in America no one can be punished for daring to conceive or to express an
unauthorized idea”—must guarantee that copyright law does not abridge “freedom of
imagination” even in the contexts of artistic speech and commercial speech).
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actualization,141 contribute to democracy,142 enable the free
enterprise system,143 and aid the search for truth.144
In Bonneville, the court’s decision to uphold the Copyright
Office’s mistaken interpretation of congressional intent resulted in an
effective prior restraint145 of commercial speech146 of radio
broadcasters and their advertisers. AM/FM webcasting had been
protected by Congress in the DPRA and DMCA when the
exemption from the statutory licensing scheme for nonsubscription
broadcast transmissions was created and perpetuated.147 Even if that
exemption was not clear to the Bonneville court, the court should
have given the benefit of the doubt in a close copyright case to a
statutory reading that remained faithful to the constitutional purpose
of copyright and favored the free flow of information. The Bonneville
court, however, prohibited radio broadcasters from doing online
what they can do over the air—broadcast copyrighted sound
recordings without paying a licensing fee—even though the policy
reasons that justify government regulation of radio are not present in
the Internet context.148

140. See id. at 14–15.
141. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 13–15 (1999) (citation
omitted).
142. See id. at 10–13.
143. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
764 (1976).
144. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market.”).
145. See Rubenfeld, supra note 134, at 6 (“[N]o First Amendment principle runs deeper
than the bar against prior restraints . . . . Yet in copyright cases . . . courts issue prior
restraints . . . all the time.”).
146. Although only the advertisements and not the copyrighted sound recordings on
AM/FM webcasts could arguably be called commercial speech, it is instructive to consider
what the policy behind the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine contributes to this
discussion. Were it not for the Copyright Act, AM/FM streaming could be regulated only if
“the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [if] it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(9) (2000); id. § 114(j)(6) (2000).
148. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania engaged in flawed statutory
interpretation and made unsupported empirical claims about
economic harm. In doing so, the court demonstrated that misplaced
fears about the impact of technology and globalization on
copyrighted works subtly threaten to further change the focus of
U.S. copyright law from promoting progress to rewarding authors.
The transformation of copyright by courts under the influence of
globalization and technology poses a particular danger with respect
to the Internet because an undue focus on the rights of copyright
holders places restrictions on access to information and inhibits
speech. When faced with close questions regarding the extent of
copyright, courts should not favor moral rights over free speech. If
they do, both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment will
suffer.
Edward L. Carter
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